“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.

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However, Chisholm statesp.

This is because intentionality, as presented here, is not a part of the mind, instead it is a way that we can describe or talk about the mind. A feature of mental states is their content.

Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers

Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation. Mental states can be differentiated and separated thouggt physical states because of their ability to misrepresent and also to change the information given to them through bodily sensations. Request removal from index. Yehudah Freundlich – – Dialogue 16 3: In contrast, thoufht a person sees a dog their experience is about the dog no matter who or what else exists in the world, and so in an important sense this about-ness, which we call intentionality, is more important.

The thoughts about that monster are further intentional states, however the language that the subject speaks about the monster or the painting that the subject does of the monster are not.


When I am thinking about something that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world. Recpe Birman – – Disputatio 3 This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n. This essay will explore the claims made by Chisholm and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind rrecipe physical or mental states.

A Recipe for Authenticity. Classical and Contemporary Reading, D. However, even Dretske asserts that bodily sensations are mental perceptions and therefore are tuought Byrne n. Intentionality must also be plainly distinguished from intensionality because mental states are not intensional, only sentences are Byrne n.

A Recipe for Thought

Chalmers, D J ed. Are intentional mental states simply physical states? Sign in Create an account. Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now Most significantly we have thoughts about external objects thoughtt are about them, but these thoughts are not caused directly by those objects. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind Physicalism in Metaphysics categorize this paper.

Science Logic and Mathematics. The criterion for this primitive intentionality is that a property, P, of a system is about some feature of the world, C, if and only if the presence of P is usually caused by C.

He also contended that it is possible dretsk two different states to be directed towards the same object and only psychological phenomena had this object directedness Chalmersp. This site uses cookies.

For Dretskep. Civil Society and its Discontents: Instead of requiring that C be the usual cause of P we instead require it to be the usual external cause of P, allowing P to be caused by internal processes drretske well specifically whatever unconscious processes produce thoughts. Added to PP index Total downloads 6, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 3of 2, How can I increase my downloads?

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Condit – – Journal of Medical Humanities 22 1: No arrangement of matter, it would seem, could be intentional because we could take an image of that arrangement, and, despite the fact that the image preserves all the relevant information, the image would not have intentionality.

With the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality it can be countered with the claim that sensations are mental states that are non-intentional Byrne n.

Classical and Contemporary Readings, D.

We intuitively understand that there are many kinds of things that can be about other things, for example photographs are about their contents. Tags Philosophy of recipr Mind. You are commenting using your Twitter account.

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. With his assessment of intentional inexistence, Brentano Byrne n. We are the ones whose purposes and attitudes determine the success or failure dreyske such physical phenomena.